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NECESSITY OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHEN VERDICT DIRECT-
ED-It has been a fundamental rule of procedure in West Vir-
ginia, emphasized by decisions, both early and late, too numerous
to mention,' that when a case has been tried before a jury, no
appellate relief involving exclusively trial error can be sought in
the Supreme Court of Appeals unless a motion in the trial court
to set aside the verdict has first been made and acted upon. Justi-
fication of this rule is based on the assumption that, in the course
of a trial by jury, the court must rule hurriedly on objections in-
terposed, in order that the case may be submitted to the jury with-
out delay, and rence may commit errors which it will concede on
due deliberation and, by granting a new trial, prevent the delay
and expense of a writ of error to obtain the same result.
"The rulings of the court during the trial are often neces-
sarily hastily made, and if a motion is made for a new trial
on the ground of erroneous rulings made at the trial, the
court may at his leisure critically review his rulings, and,
if convinced that they were erroneous, will correct them in the
only manner he can by setting aside the verdict and granting
a new trial, and thus save to the parties the expense of a writ
of error. "'
4See State v. Phares, 24 W. Va. 657 (1884); Danks v. Rodeheaver, 26 W.
Va. 274 (1885); Hinton Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co., 78 W. Va. 314,
88 S. E. 1079 (1916).
2 State v. Phares, supra n. 1.
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The West Virginia court has recognized two notable exceptions
to the general rule: first, when the court tries the case in lieu of a
jury; and second, when there is a demurrer to the evidence.' A
case in which there is a demurrer to the evidence is similar to a
ease tried by the court in lieu of a jury, in the respect that in
each case the issues are decided by the court without the aid of a
jury. But when there is a demurrer to the evidence, only the is-
sues are taken away from the jury for decision by the court and
the jury is still required to return a verdict fixing the amount of
the damages. Wherefore, although there be a demurrer to the
evidence, if either party desires to seek appellate relief with refer-
ence to the damages, he must first move in the lower court to set
aside the verdict.'
In cases coming within either of these exceptions, of course,
opportunities for the commission of trial error are largely elimi-
nated. There are no instructions to the jury, no argument of
counsel to the jury, no verdict, and no jury to be influenced by
improper remarks or acts--collectively, the most fruitful sources
of trial error. The introduction of improper evidence bearing up-
on the issues is not reversible error, because the issues are to be
tried by the court, and the courf can be depended upon, after the
due deliberation which it may exercise, to disregard the improper
evidence and decide the issues solely upon the proper evidence
introduced.' In such cases, practically the only situation left where
it might be logical to seek a new trial on the basis of trial error
committed prior to the submission of the case to the court for
decision is where the introduction of proper evidence is refused,
and a new trial would be necessary for its introduction.' In cases
tried by the court in lieu of a jury, this contingency is largely
obviated by the practice of admitting any evidence the propriety
of which, though doubtful, is not entirely remote, with the inten-
tion that the court, on final consideration of the evidence after
due deliberation, may reject improper evidence in deciding the
Capital City Supply Co. v. Beury, 69 W. Va. 612, 72 S. E. 657 (1911).
4Proudfoot v. Clevenger, 33 W. Va, 267, 10 S. E. 394 (1889); Finance
Company of America v. Bailey. 106 W. Va. 651, 146 S. E. 723 (1929).
First National Bank of Pineville v. Sanders, 77 W. Va. 716, 88 S. E. 187
(1916).
SNutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 535 (1877); State v. Thacker Coal &
C. Co., 49 W. Va. 140, 38 S. E. 539 (1901).
" See Peabody Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 528, 2 S. E. 888
(1887); Fink v. Scott, 105 W. Va. 523, 143 S. E. 305 (1928).
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,issues. Hence, generally, when there is a demurrer to the evidence
or the court tries the case in lieu of a jury, if a party is aggrieved
by the decision of the court, it is because the decision is not war-
ranted by the evidence; ordinarily, it is because the decision is
contrary to the weight of the evidence. Why is it that no motion
for a new trial is necessary in such a case as a prerequisite to seek-
ing appellate relief, while if, in a similar case, the issues are de-
cided by a jury, a party must make a motion to set the verdict
aside before he can object in the appellate court that the verdict
is contrary to the evidence?
If the reasons, as stated in State v. PlMires and other cases, on
which the general rule requiring the motion to be made when the
issues are decided by a jury are sound, then the two exceptions to
the rule must be based on the supposition that, when the court
tries a case in lieu of a jury or there is a demurrer to the evidence,
the court, in considering the weight and effect of the evidence,
does not act hastily, and likely would not change its view if a
motion for a new trial were made, and such a supposition is not
illogical. When the court tries a case in lieu of a jury, it may
take plenty of time for deliberation after the submission of the
case before deciding the issues. In fact, it is not necessary that
the trial take place wholly at a single term of court.' When there
is a demurrer to the evidence, after return of the verdict fixing
the amount of the damages, the jury is discharged and the court
can take time to deliberate upon a decision of the issues.
In Preeburn v. Railroad Company,' an attempt was made to
have the court recognize a third exception to the general rule.
In that case, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defen-
dant and the plaintiff obtained a writ of error without having
moved for a new trial in the lower court. The Supreme Court
held that the propriety of directing the verdict could not be
raised in the appellate court without first having made a motion
for a new trial in the lower court. To the plaintiff's contention
that such a case was analogous to a case in which there is a de-
murrer to the evidence, the court replied that "the analogy ex-
ists only to the extent of applying the same rules in ascertaining
the facts proven by the evidence." This observation, it is believed,
would have been a sufficient reply to the plaintiff's contention
'Ewart v. New River Fuel Co., 68 W. Va. 10, 69 S. E. 300 (1910).
79 W. Va. 789, 91 S. E. 990 (1917).
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if the further discussion based on it had been carried to a logical
conclusion; but the court contented itself with the dry, formal
and technical argument that, although the jury were told peremp-
torily how they must decide the case, still, since there was a ver-
dict, there was a trial by jury, instead of by the court, as in the
exceptions noted above, and hence that there was no reason for
differentiating this case from cases coming within the general rule.
The court seems to have lost sight of the real reason for the general
rule as stated in State v. Phzares and numerous other cases. Since it
happens that there is no verdict deciding the issues in cases coming
within the two exceptions, it seems to have been assumed by the
court that there is something mystical about the verdict itself, re-
gardless of the manner in which it is reached, which requires a mo-
tion for a new trial as a condition precedent to appellate relief. The
fact is that the logic of the general rule, as frequently stated, is
concerned only with the methods of procedure leading up to the
verdict, and the presence or absence of a verdict is a mere coin-
cidence. The question is, not whether there is a verdict, but whether
the court has ruled hastily upon matters leading up to the ver-
diet. Usually these matters involve such details as introduction of
evidence, submission of instructions and argument of counsel, but
one of them may be, and frequently is, the propriety and weight
of admitted evidence in the matter of directing a verdict. While
a court may take more time to decide this important matter than
is given to other details of the trial, it certainly can not take as
much time as it may in a case where there is no jury waiting to be
discharged, and in this respect the case of Freeburn v. Railroad
Company can easily and logically be distinguished from a case
where there is a demurrer to the evidence or where the court acts
in liez-t of a jury. It is true that in each of the three cases the court
will pursue the same course of reasoning in determining what
evidence shall be considered and what effect shall be given to the
evidence; but in two of them, it may take time and act with de-
liberation in considering these things, while in one of them it
must act with comparative haste.
In a recent case,"0 the Supreme Court has expressly overruled
Freeburn v. Railroad Company and held that, where there is a
directed verdict, no motion for a new trial is necessary in order to
10 Breedlove v. Galloway, 153 S. E. 298 (W. Va. 1930).
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prosecute a writ of error as to trial rulings. In justifying the
later decision, the court-it is believed successfully-attacks the
reasoning of the earlier case by way of demonstrating that a
directed verdict is really no verdict at all and that in such an
instance the case is actually tried by the court.
"Where a case is submitted to the court in lieu of a jury,
the motion to set aside the verdict is not necessary. Nor is
it necessary where there is a demurrer to the evidence. This
court has repeatedly recognized the fact that a motion to di-
rect a verdict amounts to a demurrer to the evidence. Then,
in view of this practice, why require a motion to set aside the
verdict where it has been directed? This court in the Freeburn
case makes the following observation: 'Technically there is
no difference between a verdict, superinduced by erroneous
instructions as to the law of the case, and a verdict rendered
in obedience to a peremptory instruction. In either case the
court's erroneous- ruling is responsible for the verdict.' Oi
such premise, together with the holdings of the Kentucky,
Oklahoma, and Tennessee cases, hereinbefore cited, the con.
clusion was reached in that case that a motion for a new trial
was essential to a review of the error. To our mind, the find-
ing on the main issue in a directed verdict is just as surely a
finding of the court as if the matter had been heard by it
in lieu of a jury. The jury's action is a mere form, brought
about by the fact that it had been impaneled to try the case,
and does not amount to a verdict in the common acceptation
of trials by jury.' "
The futility of the reasoning in the Freeburn Case may be con-
ceded without difficulty, but is a refutation of that reasoning alone
sufficient to justify the holding in the later case? If the presence
or absence of an actual verdict and the question whether the case
was actually tried by a jury or by the court are not the ultimate
proper tests, does the reasoning in the later case amount to any-
thing more, so to speak, than an immaterial joinder of issue as to
the false tests proposed in the earlier case? If the true test is
whether the ruling complained of was made under such circum-
stances that it must ordinarily have been made without full de-
liberation, what difference should it make whether there was a
verdict, or whether the court or the jury tried the case? If the
true reason for the general rule is that stated in State v. Phares and
numerous other cases, then it is believed impossible to differentiate
a case where there is a directed verdict from other cases coming
n Idem.
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within the rule, unless it can be assuned that the court, in acting
on a motion to direct a verdict, takes substantially more time in
considering the evidence, as to its propriety, effect and weight,
than it does in ruling upon other trial matters. If the court does
use such deliberation, then it is believed that this fact, and not
the presence or absence of a verdict or the method of trial, must
be stated as the true reason for any differentiation.
Whatever the difficulty of accepting the late case as a logical
exception to the general rule as stated in State v. Phares, the rule
of practice established by it may, after all, not result in calamity.
It should be noted that the general rule itself is not sanctioned in
some of the states. In Virginia the practice is regulated by
statute.
"The failure to make a motion for a new trial in any case in
which an appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas lies to or from
a higher court shall not be deemed a waiver of any objection
made during the trial if such objection be properly made a
part of the record."'
In cases where a verdict is directed for the plaintiff, as in cases
where there is a demurrer to the evidence, damages are assessed
by the jury as determined from the evidence introduced at the
trial. Presumably, by analogy to the cases where there is a de-
murrer to the evidence, it would still be necessary in such cases to
make a motion to set aside the verdict assessing the damages as a
prerequisite to raising any objection as to the damages in the
appellate court.
-LEo CARLIN.
VA. CoDE ANN. (1924) § 6254.
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